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 Chapter 2 
 The Participation of Latin America 
and the Caribbean in International 
Supply Chains 
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the concept of international supply chain is 
typically understood as a group of fi rms in different countries that work together—
from the design to the distribution of a product—under the coordination of a lead 
fi rm that seeks to minimize total system costs. Unfortunately, very few existing 
trade or foreign direct investment databases provide enough information to verify 
that the cross-border transactions that economists observe conform to this defi ni-
tion. Therefore, short of working with case studies, empirical research in this area 
has relied primarily on proxies to measure value-chain participation. 
 No single measure is likely to address all the nuances related to offshoring, and 
no single method is immune to some form of criticism. Therefore, in this chapter, 
rather than relying on a single indicator we gather various types of datasets on trade 
and FDI to construct a battery of alternative measures. The goal is to present as 
comprehensive a picture as possible of the participation of Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC) in international production networks. The various indicators pro-
vide a very consistent picture of how LAC fares relative to other regions regarding 
participation in global supply chains. 
 Evidence from Intra-industry Trade Indexes 
 The fi rst measure relies on intra-industry trade indexes (see Fukao, Ishido, & Ito, 
 2003 ; Jones, Kierzkowski, & Leonard,  2002 ; Kimura,  2006 ). This measure is based 
on the premise that global supply chains are associated with sequential production 
links in which countries may import intermediate goods, add value, and export them 
to another country. As such, production linkages involve trading related goods at 
different stages of production. In this way, intra-industry trade can be a proxy for 
these processes, provided that this trade is measured at suffi ciently high levels of 
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aggregation. For this reason, the measures of intra-industry trade constructed here 
are based on four-digit SITC data. 1 The use of intra-industry trade measures does 
not come without limitations, however, since they also capture horizontal trade in 
the same goods, which does not necessarily refl ect participation in global supply 
chains. Nevertheless, it is reassuring that in our results, the countries that have expe-
rienced the largest increases in intra-industry trade between 1985 and 2010 are 
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, and Thailand, all of which are 
highly integrated in global supply chains. 
 Figure  2.1 depicts the evolution of the average intra-industry trade for countries 
in the Asia-Pacifi c region and for LAC (see appendix A “Trade in Value Added and 
Set of Countries” for the list of countries in each region). The fi gure shows how intra-
industry trade boomed in the Asia-Pacifi c region in the period 1985–2010 while 
increasing relatively slowly in Latin America, particularly in manufactures. This is 
the case whether we use all goods or only manufactures. The overall levels are also 
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 Fig. 2.1  Intra-industry trade indexes, regional averages.  Source : Authors’ calculations based on 
data from Comtrade 
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very different, with an average measure of intra-industry trade in the Asian region 
twice that of Latin America. The result is in line with the general notion that the 
Asian countries are far more engaged in vertical specialization and cross-border 
production sharing than the countries in LAC. 2 
 Evidence from Trade in Value Added 
 Another way to measure the participation of countries in global supply chains is to 
trace the value added of each source country in a globally integrated production net-
work. Studies have applied this approach to specifi c goods, such as the iPod and 
iPhone (Dedrick, Kraemer, & Linden,  2008 ) and the Barbie doll (Tempest,  1996 ). The 
information in these case studies is very rich, showing which countries participate in 
the supply chain of a particular good and how much value they add to its production. 
The studies have revealed, for example, that even though China exports the iPod, and 
the trade statistics report the full value of this product, the country only contributes to 
3.8 % of the value added, because many other countries also participate in the pro-
duction. This case-by-case examination of specifi c international supply chains is 
very revealing, but the approach is so data-demanding that it would be impossible 
to examine every such supply chain in which a country participates. For this reason the 
technique is impractical for measuring the participation of countries in GVCs. 
 A new group of analyses are taking a different, more practical approach to trac-
ing the value added of a country’s trade fl ows: combining input-output tables with 
bilateral trade statistics (e.g., De La Cruz, Koopman, & Wang,  2011 ; Hummels 
et al.,  2001 ; Johnson & Noguera,  2012a ,  2012b ; Koopman, Wang, & Wei,  2008 , 
 2014 ; Miroudot & Ragousssis,  2009 ). The literature has evolved rapidly and has 
produced an array of indicators that help quantify the extent to which countries 
participate in cross-border production sharing. 
2
  The advantage of using intra-industry trade indices is their simplicity: they only require data on 
international trade fl ows. Other approaches that only require trade data use the description of trade 
line classifi cations to pick up terms like “parts and components” as proxies for trade in intermedi-
ates. The main idea is to measure the percentage of trade in intermediates in total trade. These 
methods have been used, for instance, in Yeats ( 2001 ), Ng and Yeats ( 1999 ), and Fung, Garcia- 
Herrero, and Siu ( 2009 ). A related approach is to employ a United Nations classifi cation that sepa-
rates goods according to their use. The classifi cation is called the Broad Economic Categories 
(BEC),  http://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradekb/Knowledgebase/Intermediate-Goods-in-Trade-Statistics . 
This method has been employed, for instance, in Baldwin and Taglioni ( 2011 ). A shortcoming of 
these two methods is that they tend to rely on subjective criteria on what constitute an intermediate 
good (see Hummels, Ishii, & Yi,  2001 ). We nevertheless compare Asia and Latin America in terms 
of the share of intermediate inputs in total trade as measured by Fung et al. ( 2009 ). The results are 
in line with the fi ndings from the intra-industry trade indexes. For instance, in 1990, exports of parts 
and components as a share of total manufacturing exports was on average at around 31 % for Asia 
and 16 % for Latin America. Two decades later, in 2010, this share increased to 40 % in Asia and 
declined slightly to 14 % in Latin America. 
 Evidence from Trade in Value Added
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 In this literature, the insertion of countries in GVCs is measured with indicators 
that seek to capture the extent to which countries participate in a sequential chain of 
production activities that crosses many borders. The fi rst indicator, called import 
content of exports, introduced by Hummels et al. ( 2001 ), is based on the notion of 
vertical specialization. Vertical specialization refers to the use of imported inputs to 
produce goods that are later exported, a notion that precisely captures the idea of 
various countries linked sequentially to produce a fi nal good. More recently, the 
concept of foreign value added in exports is being used to measure vertical 
 specialization by emphasizing value added from other countries embodied in a 
country’s exports (Koopman et al.,  2014 ). Foreign value added of exports is nowa-
days a common measure of the participation of countries in vertically fragmented 
production through upstream linkages. 
 Figure  2.2 depicts the foreign value added of exports for various Latin American 
countries. The measure refl ects the share of foreign value added in each country’s 
total exports. Appendix A “Trade in Value Added and Set of Countries” explains in 
detail the methodology and data used to develop this measure. 3 The fi gure also shows 
simple averages for two comparator groups: the Asian countries and the EU-27. 
3
  There are publicly available datasets in which similar measures of trade in value added have already 
been constructed for many countries in the world. These include the World Input-Output Table, 
funded by the European Commission and developed by the University of Groningen, and the “Trade 
in Value Added (TiVA) indicators,” a joint OECD-WTO initiative. The coverage of Latin American 






















































 Fig. 2.2  GVC Participation through upstream linkages: foreign value added as a percentage of 
total exports, average 2003–2007.  Source : Authors’ calculations based on data from GTAP 7 and 8 
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We can see that in general, the participation of Latin America in GVCs averages less 
than the participation of the comparator regions. The exports originating in Asia and 
in the EU use more intensively imported intermediate inputs than Latin America’s 
exports. In particular, the exports of Asia and the EU use 12 and 15 % points more 
foreign value added, respectively, than the exports of Latin America; this suggests 
that the countries from these two regions are more involved in  sequentially linked 
production processes than the countries in the LAC region. 4 
 At fi rst it might seem surprising that a small, low-income country such as 
Honduras exhibits a measure of foreign value added that is higher than that of 
Mexico, given the latter country’s extensive production linkages with North 
American fi rms in motor vehicles, electronics, aeronautics, and other industries. 
Clearing up this apparent anomaly provides a good opportunity to further explain 
what Fig.  2.2 is measuring. A foreign value added of, say, 45 % indicates that this 
portion of the value of a country’s exports comes from other nations. This value is 
independent of the number and/or type of industries participating in global value 
chains. In the case of Honduras, for example, more than a third of the total exports 
of the country are in textiles, predominantly T-shirts. Eighty percent of the value 
added in these exports are yarns, fi bers, and other inputs that originate in other 
countries, which include the US, Mexico, China, and South Korea. This explains the 
high value of foreign value added for Honduras. 
 The example of Honduras clearly shows that global supply chains should not be 
associated exclusively with high-tech industries. Some countries participate in value 
chains of high technological content, while others, due to their comparative advan-
tage, participate in value chains of low technological content. The issue of techno-
logical content becomes clearer when we separate the foreign value added embodied 
in countries’ exports by the sectors generating such value added. The results, which 
are presented in Fig.  2.3 , were calculated on the basis of the OECD classifi cation of 
manufacturing sectors according to their technological content, 5 which is depicted 
by the two graphs on the top of the fi gure. We complete the picture by including 
foreign value added generated by the primary sector (bottom left fi gure) and from 
services (bottom right fi gure). Note that for each country, the sum of the numbers in 
the four fi gures equals the value in Fig.  2.2 .
 Through this analytical lens, Mexico has much higher foreign value added gener-
ated by high and medium-technology sectors than does Honduras, while the reverse 
remains true for low and medium low-technology sectors. This further supports 
what we mentioned earlier: Honduras’ exports, mainly of textiles and apparel, use 
mostly foreign inputs of low technological content, that is, fi bers and yarns, with 
4
  Note that there is some ambiguity in measuring GVC participation in this way. For instance, while 
the high value of foreign value added that is observed in Mexico certainly corroborates the inser-
tion of this country in many international production networks, the common concern in Mexico is 
how to continue participating in many of these supply chains with more Mexican value added (see 
Box  3 , Chap.  4 ), a trend that will lower this country’s share of foreign value added of exports. 
5
  OECD ( 2005 ). 
 Evidence from Trade in Value Added
18
very little inputs from high-technology sectors, while the exports of Mexico largely 
depend on high- and medium-technology intermediate inputs. 
 Figure  2.3 can also be used to compare the status of Latin America as a whole 
with that of our comparator regions. For instance, the average values for the EU and 
Asia are higher than for LAC in the manufacturing sectors and in services, but the 
reverse is true for the primary sector. In other words, Europe and the Asia-Pacifi c 
countries are more involved than Latin America in the co-production of goods that 
largely utilize manufacturing sector inputs, as well as those from services; Latin 
America, on average, is more involved in the co-production of goods in which the 
main inputs come from the primary sector. 
 Returning to Fig.  2.2 , another interesting fi nding is the high degree of heteroge-
neity that exists within Latin America, with Mexico and the countries in Central 
America showing the largest shares of foreign value added of exports and the coun-
tries in South America showing the smallest. This heterogeneity is in part related to 
differences in the patterns of specialization across the LAC region. The production 
of primary goods and related products tends to require fewer imported inputs than 
the production of many manufactures. As production processes in South American 
countries are typically biased toward primary products, the foreign value added of 
these countries’ exports is particularly low. 
 Countries specializing in primary products are most likely to participate in the 
early stages of supply chains, providing inputs to other countries downstream rather 
than receiving inputs from abroad. To examine the extent to which the exports of a 
country are linked to vertically fragmented production downstream in the chain, we 
calculate what is known as indirect value added. This is a measure of the degree to 














































































































































































































 Fig. 2.3  Sector generating foreign value added in exports, average 2003–2007.  Source : Authors’ 
calculations based on data from GTAP 7 and 8 
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utilized in the exports of other countries. 6 This measure, which is shown in Fig.  2.4 , 
indicates the percentage of a country’s exports used as inputs in the exports of third 
countries. Note now that the countries in South America tend to have higher values 
of this measure than the countries in Central America. Note also that the average for 
the Latin American region is higher than for the EU and Asia. This suggests that the 
LAC region, on average, participates more than the EU or Asia as a supplier of value 
added downstream in the chain. But this is only true for the value added generated 
from the primary sector (as shown in Fig.  2.5 ), which decomposes the measure by 
value added generating sectors. 7 This fi gure clearly shows that the average for 
Latin America is higher than the average for the EU and Asia in the primary 
 sectors  (bottom left fi gure), while the reverse is true in the manufacturing sectors 
(top fi gures). In other words, on average, Latin American countries participate more 
than Europe and Asia in international value chains as suppliers of primary inputs, 
while Europe and Asia participate more than Latin America as suppliers of 
 manufacturing inputs with high, medium, or low technological content.
6
  Technically, indirect value added is measured as the country’s value added embodied as interme-
diate inputs in third countries’ gross exports, as a percentage of the country’s gross exports (see 
Koopman, Wang, & Wei,  2010 ). 
7
  Note that the sum of the four values for each individual country in Fig.  2.5 is equal to the value in 






















































 Fig. 2.4  GVC participation through downstream linkages: domestic value added used in third coun-
tries’ exports, average 2003–2007.  Source : Authors’ calculations based on data from GTAP 7 and 8 
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 One way to present a combined measure of value chain participation is to add the 
measure of foreign value added of exports and the measure of value added used in the 
exports of third countries (see Koopman et al.,  2014 ). This refl ects participation through 
linkages both upstream and downstream. The measure calculated by the value added 



















































































































































































































 Fig. 2.5  Sector generating domestic value added used in third countries’ exports, average 2003–
















































































































































































































 Fig. 2.6  Foreign value added (blue) and domestic value added used in third countries’ exports 
(green), by the value added generating sector, average 2003–2007.  Source : Authors’ calculations 
based on data from GTAP 7 and 8 
 
 
2 The Participation of Latin America and the Caribbean in International Supply Chains
21
the comparator regions clearly shows that our region in general participates less than 
the EU and Asia in the manufacturing (and service) segments of the global value chains, 
while it tends to participate more in the segments  associated with the primary sector.
 It is also possible to see once again how countries in Latin America differ in their 
participation. Costa Rica, Mexico, and Honduras, for example, participate more as 
recipients of foreign value added (blue segments tend to be longer than green seg-
ments), while Chile, Peru, and Bolivia participate more as providers of value added 
downstream in the chain than recipients (green segments tend to be longer than blue 
segments). Therefore, beyond the general comparison of Latin America with Europe 
and Asia, Latin America emerges as a region with large heterogeneity in value chain 
participation. On the one hand, we have countries—primarily Mexico and Central 
America—that process lots of foreign inputs that are incorporated in the export of 
goods close to their fi nal production stages, so these countries tend to be positioned 
closer to the end of the supply chain. Meanwhile, the South American countries are 
more specialized in natural resources; they provide inputs to other countries’ exports 
and thus are positioned more at the beginning of the supply chain. 
 We can construct a general measure of the position of the country in the chain 
by dividing the indirect value added and the foreign value added measures 
(see Koopman et al.,  2014 ). 8 The higher this value, the more upstream the country’s 
position in the chain. Figure  2.7 shows the results. It is interesting to see, for 
8
  This measure is the percentage of a country’s exports used as inputs in the exports of other coun-




















































 Fig. 2.7  Global value chain position, average 2003–2007.  Source : Authors’ calculations based on 
data from GTAP 7 and 8 
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 example, that the value added from Peru used as inputs in third countries’ exports is 
four times greater than the value added from other countries employed in Peruvian 
exports. Figure  2.7 shows clearly the heterogeneity within the region that we 
 mentioned before, with Mexico and Central America more at the end of supply 
chains and South America more at the beginning. Latin America as a whole is 
 positioned more upstream in global supply chains than the comparator groups due to 
the average specialization of the region towards natural resource intensive sectors.
 Summarizing the results, there is considerable heterogeneity within Latin 
America, in which Central American countries and Mexico participate more in 
downstream segments of global value chains while South American countries are 
relatively more active in upstream segments, mainly due to their specialization in 
primary sectors. Even within the group of countries participating in downstream 
supply chain segments, some economies specialize in value chains of low techno-
logical content while others focus more on high-technology segments. In general, 
however, the various indicators confi rm the general perception that Latin America 
tends to participate less than other regions in global value chains, particularly in 
value chain segments related to the manufacturing sector. 
 Two obvious questions arise from these fi ndings: Can countries in the region 
increase their participation in global value chains? And can they participate in seg-
ments of higher value added? Note that these questions do not necessarily imply 
that the countries should target industries of high technological content, such as 
electronics. Instead, the questions point to the potential even for countries with 
comparative advantages within certain industries to identify segments of high value 
that have not been exploited. For instance, Honduras has traditionally been linked to 
the low-technology global value chain in which the production of T-shirts is one of 
the main staples. Today, Honduras can use knowledge developed through the supply 
chains of exporting T-shirts to enter new export segments of the textile industry, 
such as parachutes. The same can be said for the primary sector. Abundance of 
 natural endowments and specialization in primary goods does not preclude coun-
tries from adding value in natural resource-related supply chains. These are without 
doubt important issues for the Latin American region that we will address in later 
chapters of this report. 
 We can also use this methodology to examine the contribution of the different 
world regions to global value chain participation. The idea is to see how much par-
ticipation in value chains occurs among countries of the same region and how much 
takes place with countries in other regions. For instance, do countries in Europe 
engage in international supply chains mostly with other European countries? Or are 
their production networks spread evenly across the globe? Figure  2.8 shows that the 
participation in international production networks is more intense among countries 
of the same region than with other regions. The within-region participation in the 
EU, Asia-Pacifi c, and LAC is 51 %, 47 %, and 29 %, respectively. In each case, the 
within-region participation is always the highest. This result suggests that global 
value chains do not cope well with vast distances, an issue that will recur in the rest 
of this report.
2 The Participation of Latin America and the Caribbean in International Supply Chains
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 Evidence from FDI Data 
 An alternative way to examine the participation of countries in global supply chains 
is to look at data on FDI. True, many companies offshore part of their production 
processes through independent suppliers and not through FDI. Nevertheless, multi-
nationals still play an important role in many global production networks, and look-
ing at their locations gives us an additional opportunity to analyze the extent to 
which Latin American countries take part in cross-border production sharing. 
 We employ the Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) Worldbase dataset, which covers more 
than 200 countries and territories and has been used in academic studies for various 
purposes. 9 For each fi rm in this dataset there is information on an array of variables, 
including location (city/country), industry of production, and family tree (the fi rm’s 
parent and other related parties). We follow Alfaro and Charlton ( 2009 ) in identifying 
9
  For instance, the comparison of size and diversifi cation patterns of foreign investment in North 
America (Caves,  1975 ), the development of microdata sets on enterprises (Lipsey,  1978 ), the effect 
of bank credit availability and business creation (Black & Strahan,  2002 ), the relationship between 
fi nancial development and vertical integration (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Mitton,  2009 ), the patterns 
of intra-industry and inter-industry FDI (Alfaro & Charlton,  2009 ), and the relationship between 
















 Fig. 2.8  Regional contribution to foreign value added, average 2003–2007.  Source : Authors’ cal-
culations based on data from GTAP 7 and 8 
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whether the relationship between a parent company and its subsidiary is horizontal 
(the parent and the subsidiary produce the same good), vertical (the subsidiary pro-
duces an input for the parent), or complex (the relationship is both horizontal and 
vertical). The methodology compares the industry codes (at the four-digit SIC level) 
of both parents and affi liates to examine whether they produce the same good and/or 
whether the affi liate is a supplier to its parent. The latter is determined by using the 
industry codes in combination with an input-output table to identify whether the 
industry of the subsidiary corresponds to an upstream industry of the parent’s out-
put. 10 One potential shortcoming of this approach could be uneven coverage of a 
worldwide company dataset, particularly in developing countries where information 
is harder to obtain. Appendix A “FDI Dataset”, however, provides details about the 
extensive checks and quality controls used by D&B to gather information and pres-
ents a test that appears to validate the coverage of the data. 
 Figure  2.9 shows the network of parents and their vertically linked subsidiaries 
around the world. The size of the circles in each country indicates the total number 
of parent companies located in that country that own vertically linked subsidiaries 
in other countries. The thickness and color intensity of the lines represent the num-
ber of bilateral vertical subsidiaries between each parent country and a correspond-
ing host country. Several interesting insights emerge from this fi gure. First, most 
multinational parent companies are located in industrialized countries, and a very 
large number of their foreign affi liates are also located in the industrialized world. 
This is consistent with the general fi nding in the literature that most FDI is of the 
North-North type. This is also consistent with recent evidence indicating that what 
had been thought to be horizontal FDI fl ows among developed nations are actually 
vertical FDI fl ows (Alfaro & Charlton,  2009 ). Our evidence is also consistent with 
results from a US survey: data from Fortune 1,000 companies show that more than 
60 % of all the offshoring of these companies is conducted in industrialized econo-
mies (Sturgeon, Nielsen, Linden, Gereffi , & Brown,  2012 ). 11 
 On a regional level, well-defi ned supply chain networks in Europe are led by 
Germany, those in Asia are led by Japan, and networks in North America are led by 
the US, which also has very strong links with the EU and Asia. With the exception 
of Mexico and possibly Brazil, LAC—like Africa—remains pretty much on 
the sidelines when it comes to participating in production networks led by 
multinationals. 
10
  Similar to Alfaro and Charlton ( 2009 ) we use the Bureau of Economic Analysis 1987 benchmark 
input-output table and employ alternative thresholds of the input-output total requirements 
coeffi cient. 
11
  It has been noted that supply chains have been prevalent among nearby high-wage countries, 
such as the US and Canada, or Germany and France. The trade in these supply chains is typically 
based on exploiting scale economies rather than on wage gaps. For instance, a fi rm in a developed 
country dominates the market of a particular input through continuous learning-by-doing and scale 
economies. This has been referred to as “horizontal specialization” (Baldwin,  2012 ). 
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 Figure  2.9 only provides crude evidence on the location of vertical FDI and does 
not control for factors such as differences in the level of development. One could 
expect, for instance, that more developed countries would host more foreign subsid-
iaries than less developed countries. In controlling for differences in per capita 
income, Fig.  2.10 indeed shows that there is a clear positive relationship between the 
level of income of the country and the number of vertical subsidiaries that it hosts. 
However, most countries in Latin America fall below the trend line, indicating that 
the number of foreign subsidiaries is lower than what should be expected from their 
level of development. In other words, even after accounting for differences in 
income per capita, the participation of most countries in the region seems to be low.
 Evidence from Trade in Services 
 International trade in services is a growing trend in global commerce. In particular, 
the offshoring of business functions such as accounting or IT services is part of the 
same phenomenon of international fragmentation in which fi rms decide to locate 
part of their production of components and/or services in different countries. 12 
12
  Note that the offshoring of services does not involve all trade in services. Some trade in services 
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 Fig. 2.10  Number of vertically linked foreign subsidiaries and income.  Source : Authors’ calcula-
tions based on data from Dun & Bradstreet 
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We will now examine the level of Latin America’s participation in the offshoring 
of such services and compare it with the participation of other regions. 
 We will make this comparison through an analysis of two service categories 
that are intrinsically related to global supply chains: “computer and information 
services” and “miscellaneous business, professional, and technical services.” 13 
The second category includes services related to business process outsourcing and 
knowledge process outsourcing. 14 The data are taken from the UN’s Service Trade 
Database. 
 Figure  2.11 shows the positive relationships between exports of these services 
and the countries’ GDP per capita: more developed countries tend to export more of 
these services. Also clear from the fi gure is that most countries in the region under-
perform the respective trend lines, suggesting that Latin American countries tend to 
export less of these services than would be expected given their level of economic 
development. In the next chapter, we present a model that indicates the potential 
factors behind this subpar performance.
13
  The categories are part of the Extended Balance of Payment Classifi cation, which is commonly 
used in the service trade databases of the UN, OECD, and IMF. 
14
  This category includes the following: legal services; accounting, auditing, bookkeeping, and 
 tax- consulting services; business and management consultancy and public relations services; 
advertising, market research, and public opinion polling; research and development; architectural, 
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Computer and Information Services
 Fig. 2.11  Exports of selected offshoring services and income.  Source : Authors’ calculations based 
on the UN’s Service Trade Database 
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 Recapitulating 
 Most of the indicators we used to examine the participation of LAC in global value 
chains present a similar picture: LAC’s participation generally tends to be low rela-
tive to other regions. However, there is also signifi cant heterogeneity within the 
region. For instance, Mexico and countries in Central America are more engaged in 
production networks, particularly with North America, and tend to participate in the 
fi nal stages of production networks. For their part, countries in South America typi-
cally enter supply chains in the early stages. A set of clear factors explain at least 
some of these differences. For instance, proximity to the US makes Mexico an ideal 
recipient of offshoring activities. Likewise, the sheer abundance of natural resources 
in South America biases countries to participate in more upstream stages of supply 
chains. Proximity, the endowments of natural resources, and the relative abundance 
of different classes of labor are obvious drivers behind the levels and types of 
 participation in supply chains. But they are not the only drivers. The next chapter 
uses a more rigorous analysis to identify a more complete spectrum of factors 
behind the region’s relatively subpar participation in international supply  chains. 
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